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The Detritus of Troxel
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY*

I. Introduction
This essay addresses the aftermath of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville,' which the Court decided some
six years ago as of this writing. It will be recalled that Troxel addressed
the constitutionality of the grandparent visitation statute of the State of
Washington.2 The Court in Troxel affirmed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court and held that the state statute, as applied,
unconstitutionally infringed on "the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." 3
A fresh look at Troxel certainly has a place in a symposium such as this,
which examines legal issues that arise with respect to the rights of third parties in their relationships with children in several contexts. Accordingly,
Part II of this essay sets out and discusses briefly the facts and several
opinions in the case. Part III examines state statutes relating to grandparent visitation that were in effect long before the decision in Troxel and
ways in which state courts reacted to those statutes. Then, in Part IV, the
essay evaluates the impact of Troxel on the law of grandparent visitation.

II. Troxel and its Underpinnings
In Troxel, a man and woman who were unmarried became the parents
of two children born out of wedlock.4 The parents separated after a time,
* Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Hofstra University.
The author thanks Alexis Collentine, Lisa Spar, and Maureen Quinn for invaluable assistance
in preparing this article.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
2. Id.; see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1997).
3. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66-67.
4. Id. at 60.
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and the father regularly visited his children at the home of his parents, the
paternal grandparents of the children. 5 Subsequently, the children's father
committed suicide, and their mother eventually limited visits with the
children's grandparents to one short visit each month.6 Dissatisfied with
this limitation, the grandparents sued for greater visitation rights under the
Washington statute, which provided, "Any person may petition the court
for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of the child whether or not there has
been any change of circumstances." 7
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O'Connor found the statute
to be "breathtakingly broad," pointing out that the statutory language
"effectively permits any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to statecourt review. ' '8 Also, Justice O'Connor noted, the statute "places the best
interest determination solely in the hands of the judge," 9 whose view
would prevail without any requirement that the court give any presumption of validity or any weight to the parent's decision that visitation would
not be in the best interest of the child."° Accordingly, Justice O'Connor
stated, "In practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation
petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best
interests." 1
Justice O'Connor then reviewed the facts set out in the trial record and
concluded that the record revealed no special factors to justify the state's
interference with the parent's "fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters.' 2 The record lacked any allegation or any finding that the mother of the children was unfit, an important
factor in view of the "presumption that fit parents act in the best interests
of their children.' 3 Indeed, the Washington trial court gave no special
weight to what the mother determined was in the best interests of the children involved, but, in effect, it placed on a fit parent "the burden of dis5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 60-61.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
Id.at67.
Id.
Id.
Id.at68.
Id.
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proving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. 4
Therefore, Justice O'Connor observed, "[lt]he decisional framework
employed by the [Washington] Superior Court directly contravened the
traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his
or her child. 5 Justice O'Connor then concluded:
As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions
simply because a state [trial] judge believes a "better" decision could be made.
Neither the Washington nonparental visitation statute generally-which places
no limits on either the persons who may petition for visitation or the circumstances in which such a petition maybe granted-nor the Superior Court in this
specific case required anything more. Accordingly, we hold that [the statute] as
6
applied in this case, is unconstitutional.'
It is important to note that the plurality of the Court based its decision
"on the sweeping breadth of [the Washington visitation statute] and the
application of that broad, unlimited power in this case," but stated explicitly
that it did not consider "the primary constitutional question passed on by
the Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires
all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.17 Because
state courts decide visitation standards on a case-by-case basis, the Court
stated that it was "hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation
8
statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.'
That the Supreme Court would agree to review the decision of the
Supreme Court of Washington in Troxel came as something of a surprise.19
As stated, the plurality opinion found significant the fact that state courts
had reviewed third-party-visitation statutes on a case-by-case basis.2"
Indeed, long before the Supreme Court of Washington struck down that
state's visitation statutes as it applied to grandparents, state courts had
reviewed visitation statutes in several contexts, including visitation by
stepparents, grandparents, and lesbian coparents. 2" What is more, the Court
14. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
15. Id. at 69.
16. Id. at 72-73.
17. Id. at 73.
18. Id.
19. Indeed, Justice Stevens, after commending the Court for "wisely declin[ing] to endorse
either the holding or the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington," expresses his opinion
that "the Court would have been even wiser to deny certiorari. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationalefor Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998) (collecting cases) (hereinafter Gregory, Blood Ties).
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itself had long since established, and reaffirmed with some frequency, the
constitutionally recognized principle of family autonomy and parental
authority in American law. 2" Thus, Troxel sheds no new light on the issue
of grandparent visitation. Rather, the several conflicting opinions in the
case are more likely to engender confusion.
The plurality opinion in Troxel acknowledges that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court."23 Similarly, Justice Souter, in a separate opinion, points out that the Court has "long recognized that a parent's
interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of
children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 Further, Justice Thomas, while declining to
take a view on the merits of the case, expresses his "agree[ment] with the
plurality that this Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children resolves this case.25 In the same
vein, Justice Kennedy asserts that there is general, and perhaps unanimous
agreement, in the separate opinions in Troxel, stating: "As our case law
has developed, the custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine,
without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and
educate the child.26
The reference in all of these opinions is, of course, to the long line of
decisions in which the Court established, and has continued to recognize,
the strong and enduring tradition of family autonomy and parental authority in American law,27 which one commentator describes as follows:
The traditional view of our society is that the care, control, and custody of children resides first in their parents; in fact "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."...
This parental interest in family relationships has been defined as a liberty in28
terest entitled to due process protection.
22. See CALEB FOOTE ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1-26 (2d ed. 1976);
Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reflections About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 615-26 (discussing the common
law and constitutional backgrounds of parental rights).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Gregory, Blood Ties, supra note 21, at 382-84.
Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of Children in

Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 95, 109 (1995). Another

writer accurately points out that the Supreme Court "has consistently held that matters touching
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Early in the twentieth century, in Meyer v. Nebraska,29 the United
States Supreme Court recognized, and ringingly endorsed, the right "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children" as a liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ° In the ensuing years, the Court has never
faltered in its strong support of the prerogative of parents confronted by
state intrusions into family affairs. Just two years after its decision in
Meyer, the Court reaffirmed the family autonomy principle in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,3' when it enjoined the enforcement of the Oregon
Compulsory Education Law against two private educational institutions.
In Pierce the Court observed:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty interests of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not
be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State. ... The child is not the mere creature of the
with
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
32
the high duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

Accordingly, the Court found that the statute requiring public school

attendance was violative of the Constitution and was, therefore, not
enforceable.
Almost fifty years after its decisions in Meyer and Pierce, the Court in
Wisconsin v. Yoder 33 once again relied on the principles of family autonomy and parental authority when it affirmed a judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin that overturned the criminal convictions, under the
state's compulsory education law, of parents who were members of the
Old Order Amish religion. The Court, quoting its language in Pierce,
characterized that case as "perhaps the most significant statement of the
Court in this area.34 The Court also observed:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that
of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
on natural parent-child relationships and involving the custody and control of one's children are
fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As such,
they are entitled to the greatest constitutional protection." Marian L. Faupel, The "Baby Jessica
Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between Children's and Parents' Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV.
285, 289 (1994).
29. Meyer v. Nebraksa, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30. Id. at 399.
31. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
32. Id. (citation omitted).
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. Id. at 232.
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concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. The primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their35children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition.
Thus, as most recently in Troxel, the Court in a variety of contexts has
unswervingly, repeatedly, and strongly endorsed parental authority and
36
the principle of family autonomy.

III. The Viability of Third-Party Visitation
Statutes Before Troxel
Long before the Court's decision in Troxel, state courts had begun
addressing with some frequency whether grandparents enjoyed a right to
visitation with their grandchildren over the objection of the children's parents. This is not surprising in light of the fact that for several years there
have been third-party-visitation statutes, applicable to grandparents, in all
fifty states.37 One commentator has expressed the view that, "[s]ince these
statutes are the product of a combination of lobbying efforts of grandparent groups and the sentimentality of the state legislatures, they take so

many different forms and limit visitation to so many different kinds of circumstances that it is extremely difficult to classify them.3" Nevertheless,
the approach of most of these statutes is based on the best-interests-of-thechild standard.39 Purporting to apply this standard, a number of state
35. Id.
36. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (stating that natural parent is entitled to due process at state-initiated parental fights termination proceeding); Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977) (outlining procedures required to remove foster
children from foster homes); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
(holding that mandatory termination provisions for pregnant public school teachers violate due
process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that state statute that allows
removal of children from custody of unwed father upon death of mother violates due process
fights of father); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953) (ruling that Wisconsin decree does
not bind Ohio court in habeas corpus proceeding attacking right of mother to retain possession
of minor children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that certain areas
of family life exist, which state may not enter); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that state statute providing for sterilization of criminals violates prisoner fights).
37. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73, n.1 (2000); see also David L. Walther, Survey
of Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 11 J. FAM. L. 95, 96 (1997) (noting that all fifty states recognize grandparent visitation rights to some extent); Catherine A. McCrimmon & Robert J.
Howell, Grandparents' Legal Rights to Visitation in the Fifty States and the District of
Columbia, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 355, 355-56 (1989) (observing that access to
grandparents, regardless of other legal situations, is now considered the child's legal fight).
38. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 19.7
at 828 (2d ed. 1988).
39. See Gregory, Blood Ties, supra note 21, at 388 (noting that best interests of the child "is
the dominant standard in statutes that permit third-party visitation by grandparents, stepparents,
and other petitioners under a variety of circumstances").
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courts rejected constitutional attacks on grandparent visitation statutes
long before the Court's decision in Troxel. An early example is King v.
King, n° in which the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted a petition for
grandparent visitation rights, despite the constitutionally based opposition
of the child's parents. The court in King, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, asserted
that it recognized "the right to rear children without undue governmental
interference. 4 But it promptly turned away from this constitutional principle,
stating that "the right is not inviolate," as evidenced by the requirement
that parents must provide for the education of their children, and citing laws
that required restraint of children in motor vehicles, regulation of child
labor, and requiring the inoculation of children against disease. n2 Having
cavalierly disposed of relevant constitutional principles, the Kentucky court
addressed that state's grandparent visitation statute.
The statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of the parents, grandparents
and the child. At common law, grandparents had no legal right to visitation.
However, the [legislature] determined that, in modem day society, it was essential that some semblance of family and generational contact be preserved. If a
grandparent is physically, mentally and morally fit, then a grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with the grandparent. That grandparents and grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from
contact with the other. The child can learn respect, a sense of responsibility and
love. The grandparentcan be invigorated to exposure to youth, can gain an
insight into our changing society, and can avoid the loneliness which is so often
a part of an aging parent'slife. These considerationsby the state do not go too
43
far in intruding into the fundamental rights of parents.

As a dissenting judge in King cogently observed in reaction to the opin-

ion of the majority of the Court:
The opinion of the majority makes little pretense of constitutional analysis but
depends entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent value in visitation
between grandparent and grandchild, regardless of the wishes of the parents.
The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is its conclusion that a grandparent has a
"fundamental right" to visitation with a grandchild. No authority is cited for
this proposition as there is no such right."

While it may be true that no other state court freighted its opinion with
language that so blatantly ignores the constitutional rights of fit parents,

there are certainly other cases in which states' highest courts have decided
visitation petitions of grandparents with precious little concern for the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
Id. at 631.

Id.
Id. at 632 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
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parental autonomy decisions of the United States Supreme Court. A decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Herndon v. Tuhey 45 similarly
upheld as constitutional a statute that permitted the trial court to grant to
a grandparent reasonable visitation rights, if visitation was denied unreasonably for more than ninety days. 46 The statute in Herndon also required
a determination by the court whether grandparent visitation would endanger
the child's physical health or impair the child's emotional development,4 7
and allowed the court to grant visitation by grandparents "when the court
finds such visitation to be in the best interests of the child.4 8 The court
rejected the parents' argument that the statute was an infringement of their
"basic constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit, free from
state intrusion absent a showing of harm to the child. 49 After citing King,
and quoting at length from the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion, the
court concluded:
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it contemplates only a minimal
intrusion on the family relationship and because it is narrowly tailored to adequately protect the interests of parents and children.... A court may grant visitation only if it will be in the best interest of the child. If visitation would
endanger the child, physically, mentally, or emotionally then visitation must be
50
denied.

As in King, however, a strong dissenting opinion observed that "[t]he

majority opinion's holding rests in actuality upon a trial court's discretion,
rather than upon traditional principles of constitutional analysis. 51 The
dissenting opinion also concluded that "[a] best interest test standing

alone does not justify intrusion into the parents' constitutionally protected right of autonomy in child rearing.52
The highest courts of several other states, prior to Troxel, followed the
lead of King and Herndon, upholding grandparent visitations statutes over
parents' constitutionally based objections.53 Indeed, one academic legal
45. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
46. Id. at 206-08.
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id., (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (West 1997).
49. Id. at 207.
50. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
51. Id. at 211 (Covington, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1114, 1149 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the
Wyoming grandparent visitation was constitutional in light of the state's compelling interest in
protecting the best interests of the child); Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912, 915 (Miss. 1997)
(rejecting a parent's assertion that the statute was unconstitutional and holding that the statute
"[d]id not deprive the parents of their right to raise their children by determining the care, custody and management of the child.").
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commentator identified "a trend to extend grandparent visitation statutes
to the traditional intact family. 54 Yet not all of the highest state courts
reviewing the statutes prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel
were inclined to reject parents' opposition to grandparent visitation. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Hawk v. Hawk,55 holding
that the Tennessee grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional, is
the leading case to express a contrary view.
The parents in Hawk, after several family disputes, put an end to their
children's visitation with the paternal grandparents.56 The grandparents
sued under a Tennessee statute that permitted the court to order reasonable visitation between minor children and their grandparents after a
determination that such visitation was in the child's best interest. The trial
court, finding that family disputes should not interfere with relationships
between grandparents and their grandchildren, ordered liberal visitation.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order, holding
that the statute violated the parents' right to privacy under the Tennessee
Constitution "as applied to [a] married couple whose fitness as parents is
unchallenged."5 7 Although its decision was based on the state constitution,
the court pointed out that "the right to rear one's children is so firmly rooted
in our culture that the United States Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.58 After reviewing Supreme Court decisions carefully
and at length, and citing federal and state cases and statutory law, the court
determined that state interference with parents' right to raise children
must be based on harm to the child's welfare.59 The court concluded:
[W]ithout a substantial danger of harm to the child, a court may not constitutionally impose its own subjective notions of the "best interests of the child"
when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married parents is involved. By holding
that an initial showing of harm to a child is necessary before the state may intervene to determine the "best interests of the child," we approve the reasoning of
cases that have balanced state interests against
both Tennessee and federal
60
parental privacy rights.
54. Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: But Court-Ordered
GrandparentVisitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 52 (1993).
55. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W. 573 (Tenn. 1993).
56. Id. at 575.
57. Id. (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8).
58. Id. at 578.
59. Id. at 580-81.
60. Id. at 579-80. See also Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (applying
the principles of Hawk to deny visitation rights to paternal grandparents who sought visitation
rights over the objections of the child's mother and adopting father, rejecting the grandparents
argument that constitutional protection of parental rights and family privacy was "limited to
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In a holding that is entirely consistent with that of the Supreme Court
of Tennessee, in Brooks v. Parkerson6 1 the Supreme Court of Georgia
invalidated, on constitutional grounds, a grandparent visitation statute that
allowed the court to "grant any grandparent ...reasonable visitation with
rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation
rights necessary to the best interests of the child."62 The court found that
under both the state and federal constitutions the statute was unconstitutional, "because it does not clearly promote the health the health or welfare
of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state intervention is authorized.6 3
In Beagle v. Beagle,' the Supreme Court of Florida took a similarly
jaundiced view of the grandparent visitation statute in that state. The court
struck down as unconstitutional a statutory amendment that provided for
grandparent visitation in intact families that required the trial court to grant
reasonable visitation rights over a married natural parent's objection so
long as the visitation would be in the child's best interests and regardless of
the fact that the relationship between the child's parents and grandparents
was fractured.65 After canvassing the "divergent view in other jurisdictions
as to whether the government can constitutionally infringe upon the rights
of parents to raise their children,6 6 the court addressed the "very narrow"
issue that it faced: "Does the state have a compelling state interest in
imposing grandparental visitation rights, in an intact family, over the
objection of at least one parent? ' 67 Noting the clear holdings of its earlier
cases, the court in Beagle held that the amended statute before it did not
satisfy such a compelling state interest standard, such as"when it acts to
prevent demonstrable harm to the child."68

married, natural parents who have maintained continuous custody of their children and whose
fitness as parents has not been challenged."), Id. at 684; see also Ellison v. Ellison, 994 S.W.2d
623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
61. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 790 (Ga. 1995).
62. Id. at 770-71. Subsequently, the Georgia legislature amended the statute to permit visitation rights by grandparents when a "court finds the health or welfare of the child would be
harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interests of the child would be served
by such visitation." GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(C) (1999).
63. Id. at 774.
64. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
65. Id. at 1273 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 752.01(1)(e) (West 1997).
66. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1272 (Fla. 1996) (citing Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773; Herndon v.
Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Mo. 1993); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993);
Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Wyo. 1995)).
67. Id. at 1276.
68. Id.

The Detritus of Troxel

143

IV. Post-Troxel Developments
Following the lead of Hawk, Brooks, and Beagle, some state courts,
before Troxel, adopted an approach contrary to King and Herndon and have
invalidated grandparent visitation statutes on constitutional grounds. 69 To
put it simply, state courts in these more recent grandparent-visitationstatute cases have not hesitated in placing a constitutionally mandated
limit on statutes that afford to grandparents rights that threaten family
autonomy, impair parental privacy, and harm the rights of fit parents to
raise, manage, and care for their children. Respectful of long-standing
constitutional principles, these courts have declined to hold that the "best
interest of the child" doctrine controls and outweighs family autonomy
principles in grandparent visitation statutes.
One might have wished, in light of the slew of state grandparent visitation statutes in all fifty states,7" that the Court would have issued a decision under which the constitutionality or invalidity of such statutes would
be clear and settled. Instead, the Court produced a plurality opinion and
five separate and conflicting concurring or dissenting opinions, one effect
of which was to engender a not insignificant increase in the law review literature dealing with grandparent visitation. 7 1 As one article in the popular
press, published the day after the decision in Troxel, put it, "yesterday's
decision generated six separate opinions from the nine justices, producing
enough confusion that some lawyers ...

argued that the Supreme Court

ruling did not strike down the Washington state law but pertained only to
this particular case. 72 Even if it is true that Troxel generated excitement
among law review editors and confusion among lawyers, a review of decisions by the highest courts that have addressed grandparent visitation
some six years after Troxel teaches that its impact has not been remarkable.
69. See, e.g., Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999) (declaring that North Dakota's
grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va.
1998) (holding that a statute that permitted visitation by grandparents and other nonparents was
unconstitutional); Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998) (holding that Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied in a case where neither harm to the child
nor unfitness of the parent was shown).
70. See supra, note 37.
71. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitationfor NonparentsAfter Troxel v. Granville: Where
Should States Draw the Line, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 727 (2001); Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and

Grandparental)Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69 (2001); Ellen
Maurus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents' House We Go: Or Do We,
Post Troxel? 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751 (2001); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother)
Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parentsand ParentalDeference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 865 (2003).
72. Edward Walsh, Court Limits Visitation Rights of Grandparents;State Can't Overrule
Decision of a Fit Parent,Justices Say, WASH. POST, June 6, 2000, at A I.
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Simply stated, Troxel has induced no startling or radical changes with
respect to third-party visitation, and particularly grandparent visitation.
Legislators in just a few states have amended their visitation statutes on
the heels of Troxel in an apparent effort to make them compliant with the
Supreme Court's pronouncements.73 But judicial approaches are remarkably
similar to those taken in the earlier decisions that we have discussed.7 4
7 5
For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Linder v. Linder,
some two years after Troxel was decided, rejected the arguments of three
sets of grandparents who urged that the state statute should be subjected
to strict scrutiny and was facially unconstitutional under that standard. It
also rejected the position of the state, as intervenor in defense of the
statute, and found that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.7 6 The
Supreme Court of Connecticut in Roth v. Weston, 77 noting that under
Troxel "there is a presumption that a fit parent's decision is in the best
interest of the child,7 8 held that in the absence of a finding that denial of
visitation would harm the children involved, the trial court's grant of visitation violated the father's due process rights under the state and federal
constitutions. 79 Again, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in Wickham v.
Byrne,8" that the state's grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional
on its face because it permitted the child's grandparents and great-grandparents to visit if the court found visitation to be in the child's best interest
and welfare. Accordingly, the court held that the Illinois statute was like
the one in Troxel in that it, "directly contravenes the traditional presumption that parents are fit and act in the best interest of their children.., and
allows the 'State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a "better"
decision could be made.' ,81
The Supreme Court of Iowa struck down provisions of its statute twice
during the course of one year. In In re Marriage of Howard 2 the court
73. See Holly M. Davis, Note and Comment: Non-Parent Visitation Statutes: Was Troxel
Their Death Knell?, 23 WHrITER L. REv. 721, 744-47 (2002).
74. See infra, notes and accompanying text.
75. Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841 (Ark. 2002).
76. The court reversed the trial court decision, which had found an otherwise fit parent to
be unfit based on her choosing to fight a nonparental visitation petition. Id. Two months later,
in Seagrave v. Price, 79 S.W.3d 339 (Ark. 2002), the Arkansas court again found the statute to
be unconstitutional as applied for failing to apply a presumption in favor of the parental decision on visitation.
77. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002).
78. Id. at 451.
79. Id. at 453.
80. Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d I (111.2002).
81. Id. at 7-8.
82. In re Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003).
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noted that it had previously found one section of the statute facially
unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution.83 The court emphasized that
the fact that the child's parents were divorced did not affect the fundamental liberty interest of fit parents to care for their children and, accordingly, invalidated the provision of the statute that permitted grandparent
visitation when the child's parents were divorced. The court also refused
to depart from this principle in a case in which one of the parents had died.
Again, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Derose v. Derose8 4 found that
the state's statute was "unconstitutional as written" because it "fails to
require that a trial court accord deference to the decisions of fit parents
regarding grandparent visitation ..
*"85 Finally, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in In re C.A.M.A., 8 6 struck down the amended grandparent
visitation statute that was enacted in response to the Court's holding in
Troxel that invalidated its prior statute. The new Washington law provided that grandparent visitation was presumed to be in the best interest of
the child on a showing that a significant relationship existed.87 The Court
found that the statute was unconstitutional because, among other things, it
"contravenes the constitutionally required presumption that the fit parent
acts in the child's best interests. 88
While the highest courts of several states, as discussed, have found
grandparent visitation statutes to be facially unconstitutional, a few other
states have determined that such statutes are unconstitutional as applied.
In Medaris v. Whiting,89 for example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
held that the trial court had failed to defer to the decision of a fit parent.
In Glidden v. Conley,90 the Supreme Court of Vermont, although it found
that the statute was facially valid, held that the trial court had failed to
consider a fit parent's decision, thereby violating the parent's rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment to raise a child without undue state interference. 9' As was the case before Troxel, a fair number of state's have found
grandparent visitation statutes to be constitutional. In Blixt v. Blixt,92 for
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that its statute, enacted
prior to the Supreme Court's decision, was not as broad as the Washington
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 185 (citing Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001)).
Derose v. Derose, 666 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 2003).
Id. at 643.
In re C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d 405 (Wash. 2005).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 411.
Medaris v. Whiting, 695 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 2005).
Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003).
Id. at 205-07.
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002).
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statute struck down in Troxel and survived a facial challenge based on
both due process and equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court of
Missouri in Blakely v. Blakely93 similarly upheld its visitation statute as
constitutional as it had done in Herndon v. Tuhey 94 some years before the
Troxel decision."
Other state courts have either distinguished, followed, or applied the
principles of the decision in Troxel in a variety of factual situations, leaving
their states' grandparent visitation statutes intact.96 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, in In re Cathy L.(R.) M., 97 for example, discussed
the requirements of Troxel and emphasized that a parent's objection to
visitation would not, in every case, defeat a grandparent's visitation petition.
In the case before it, the court found that after incorporating the parents'
wishes in its analysis, visitation was nevertheless not in the best interests
99
of the child.9 8 The Supreme Court of Maine, in Conlogue v. Conlogue,
citing and discussing both Troxel and its own prior holding, found no
compelling state interest in establishing or maintaining a relationship
between grandparents and a child whose parent had died. Accordingly, the
court held that forcing the child's mother to defend against a grandparent
visitation petition would be in violation of her due process rights."° In a
case where none of the parties had relied on Troxel, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska in Nelson v. Nelson' 0 relied on that decision in affirming the
dismissal of a grandparent visitation order. These cases are typical of the
fairly routine ways in which state courts have reacted to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Troxel.'o2
93. Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 2002).
94. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
95. See also Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio 2005) (holding that the state's visitation statute was not, under Troxel, either unconstitutional on its face or as applied); State ex.
rel Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 685 (W. Va. 2001) (concluding that the statute, when
compared with the flaws that the Court found in Troxel, "does not violate the substantive due
process right of liberty extended to a parent in connection with his/her right to exercise care,
custody, and control of his/her child[ren] without undue interference from the state).
96. See, e.g., Walther, supra note 37.
97. In re Cathy L.(R.)M., 617 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 2005).
98. Id. at 875.
99. Conlogue v. Conlogue, 890 A.2d 691 (Me. 2006).
100. Id. at 695.
101. Nelson v. Nelson, 674 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2004).
102. See also Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002) (distinguishing Troxel in
context of petition for stepparent visitation); Ex parte D.W., 835 So. 2d 186 (Ala. 2002) (finding Troxel inapplicable where maternal grandparents sought visitation with child legally adopted by paternal grandparents); In re Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004) (finding Troxel inapplicable
when parents disagree with respect to grandparent visitation); Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d
565 (S.C. 2003) (reversing visitation order absent finding of parental unfitness or compelling
reasons to overcome presumption that decision by fit parents is in child's best interests).
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In sum, while the Court's fractionated decision in Troxel may have
been a law review editor's dream, it has not turned out to be a practitioner's
nightmare. The state courts that have decided grandparent visitation cases
after Troxel have, for the most part, taken the Supreme Court's decisions
in stride and continued to decide such cases without effecting significant
changes in the legal landscape. The Court's decision in Troxel has had little, if any, predictive value. State courts analyzing grandparent visitation
statutes will continue, it appears, to decide the cases on an ad hoc basis.

